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1. Introduction 
 
It has been well established that the effectiveness of disinflation programmes depends 
crucially on the role of credibility factors. If the announced policies lack of credibility, 
private agents would eventually recognize that the publicised disinflation programme would 
not be sustainable in the long run. On the contrary, if agents are confident in the ability of the 
authorities to carry out a newly announced disinflation programme, changing inflationary 
expectations will reduce downward rigidities that characterize the inflationary process and 
therefore a reduction in the actual inflation may result.   
The recent literature on the credibility of a disinflationary policy and the recent 
experience of stabilisation programs in the European countries, indicate that disinflation may 
be achieved either by setting up a Central Banks which is independent from the government 
influence on monetary financing budget deficits, or by an exchange-rate policy based on a 
hard peg with respect to a low inflation currency in order to import credibility.  
The independent Central Bank proposition may be explained by two arguments. The 
first relies on the employment motivation for monetary expansion based upon the assumption 
that political forces in democratic societies may tempted to trade price stability for temporary 
decreases in unemployment. The second argument is revenue motivation for monetary 
expansion. This argument relies on the risk of the government exploiting the Central Bank’s 
capacity to create seigniorage to finance expenditure that the government is unwilling to 
finance out of current or future taxation.  
 Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) compare the monetary regimes of eighteen 
industrial countries  during the post-war period by focusing on political and economic 
independence of the Central Bank. According to their proposition the Political independence 
is defined as the capacity of the monetary authority to choose the final goals of monetary 
policy, such as inflation or the unemployment. On the other hand the Economic independence 
is identified with the nature of the monetary instruments under the control of the Central 
Bank and with the influence of the government in borrowing from the Central Bank. 
The latter aspect seems particularly relevant for some European countries where 
monetary financing of budget deficits was common practice1. Thus the domestic monetary 
regime matters for the average inflation rate. Countries with a low degree of Central Bank 
independence experienced disinflation programs based on the exchange rate hard pegging 
                                                                 
1 Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) find empirical evidence (using cross section data over the period 
1950-1989) that Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain were associated with very little economic independence 
whilst the central banks of Austria, Switzerland, the U.S and West Germany indeed had high economic 
independence.    
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vis-à-vis to a strong currency in order to import credibility from a  low inflation country  with 
an independent Central Bank such Germany.  In this context, disinflation is usually a fairly 
persistent process in the sense that if inflation becomes very high, it does not quickly revert to 
its earlier level. In this respect Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) find empirical evidence that 
exchange-rate regimes matter for the persistence of inflation. They demonstrate that fixed 
exchange rate regimes appear to be associated with negligible persistence of inflation, while 
regimes of managed exchange rates are associated with very high inflation persistence. They 
propose that the higher inflation persistence is the result of the higher monetary and exchange 
rate accommodation of price changes in exchange rate regimes.  
  The purpose of this paper is to advance the theoretical arguments that low inflation 
persistence may be achieved either by setting up an independent Central Banks or by using an 
exchange rate policy pegging the currency to a low inflation currency and support them with 
empirical evidence. Our theoretical analysis on the inflation persistence is closely related to 
the Lucas critique, which states that policy regime changes affect the parameters of reduced-
form models. On the other hand, our empirical analysis concerns a group of selected EMU 
countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Greece) for the period 1980-1999. The 
procedure used in the past for testing the relevance of the Lucas critique and examine the 
timing of the change in the stochastic process driving inflation was the time-varying 
parameters procedure with the Kalman filter approach (see Agenor and Taylor, 1992). 
However, this approach ignores the time series properties of the variables in question. The 
approach used in this paper, although similar with the one applied by Burdekin and Siklos 
(1999), it endogenously determines the most likely date for the change in regime. It consists 
of testing for an unknown break point in a time series and it is based upon the recently 
advanced work by Perron (1997), which proposes series of tests where the null hypothesis of 
a unit root is set against the alternative of stationarity about a single broken trend line.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the theoretical 
framework. In section 3 we discuss how the degree of Central Bank independence and the 
exchange rate policy affect the inflation persistence. Section 4 presents the econometric 
methodology and the empirical results. Section 5 summarises the main conclusions of the 
paper. 
 
2. The theoretical framework 
In this section, a simple open economy macroeconomic model is presented in order to build 
up the theoretical propositions. The model consists of aggregate demand and aggregate    
3                                                                                    
supply equations where the role of government is introduced by the budget constraint and the 
actions of monetary authorities are shaped by exchange rate accommodation rules. 
 
2.1.The model  
The aggregate demand-aggregate supply model is characterised with overlapping wage 
contracts2 and comprises five relationships, listed as equations (1) through (5) below: 
 
      ( ) 0 ,       ,       > + + - = b a b a t t t t t d q p m y                      (1) 
t t t t p p e q - + =
*                  (2) 
( )( ) t t t t w w p q - + = -1   2 / 1                (3) 




t t y E y p E p w g          (4) 
( ) 1 0           ,     1   < < - + = d d t t
c
t q p p               (5) 
 
All variables, except interest rate, are in logarithms. The aggregate demand is given by 
equation (1), where t y  is the log of the real output,  t m  is the log of the nominal money stock, 
t p  is the log of the domestic output price level,  t q  is the log of the real exchange rate and  t d  
is the log of the real budget deficit. The real exchange rate defined in equation (2), where  t e  
is the log of  the nominal exchange rate (units of domestic currency per unit of foreign 
currency) and 
*
t p  the log of the foreign price level.  
Equations (3), (4) and (5) define the model’s supply side. They take a similar form to that of 
the Taylor’s (1980) staggered contract model. Equation (3) is a mark-up equation, where  t q  
is a productivity shock with zero mean and constant variance. Domestic output price level is 
a constant mark-up over weighted average contract nominal wages in the current and 
preceding periods. Equation (4) is the wage-contracting equation, where  t w  is the log of 
nominal wages, 
c
t p  denotes the log of the consumption price level and  t E  is the operator of 
rational expectations conditional on the information at period t.  Under this specification, 
wage contracts are set for half the labour force each period and last two periods, and wage-
setters aim to achieve a constant real wage for the duration of the contract. According to 
equation (4), cost-push (first term) and demand-pull inflationary factors (second term) 
                                                                 
2 The theoretical model presented in the text is similar to the model employed by Agénor and Taylor (1992) to 
determine the  link between credibility and inflation persistence. An alternative theoretical framework is used 
by Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) to study the link between inflation persistence and policy rules. 
    
4                                                                                    
determine the wage setting. Finally, equation (5) defines the consumers’ price level as a 
weighted average of domestic prices and foreign imported goods prices. 
 
 
2.2. The financing of budget deficits 
We introduce now the government budget constraint that links monetary and fiscal policy by 
getting the log-linear version of the government budget flow constraint as follows (see 
appendix A) :  
( ) ( )( ) 1 1   / ) 1 ( ) / ( - - - - + - = + t t t t t t m m b b p d l y l y      (6) 
 
According to (6) given the price level, the authorities (the Central Bank and the government) 
have three policy variables: monetary policy,  t m , fiscal policy,  t d , and bond sales to the 
public,  t b . Given the price level and the bond sales to the public to be chosen independently, 
the two policy variables,  t m  and  t d , are interdependent and the extent to which (6) binds  t m  
given  t d or vice versa, depends on the way monetary and fiscal policies are coordinated.  
According to Sargent and Wallace (1981), we consider two alternative forms of 
monetary and fiscal coordination. On the one hand, monetary policy dominates fiscal policy. 
The Central Bank sets monetary policy by choosing  t m and therefore, determines the amount 
revenue it will supply the government through monetary seignorage.  On the other hand, 
fiscal policy dominates monetary policy. The government sets its deficit  t d . Under this 
coordination scheme the Central Bank faces the constraints imposed by the private sector 
demand for government bonds, since it must finance with seignorage any discrepancy 
between the revenue demanded by government and the amount of bonds  t b that can be sold to 
the pubic. Thus, for a Central Bank to be able to control inflation permanently, the first 
coordination scheme is more powerful than the second coordination scheme. If the 
government’s deficit cannot be financed solely by new private bond sales, then the Central 
Bank is forced towards monetary accommodation of the government budget deficit.  
In this respect, taking into account that a fraction f  of the nominal budget deficit is financed 
by private bond sales, and that the remaining  ( ) f - 1  is financed by money supply, we can 
write that the private bond sales are governed by 3: 
                                                                 
3 We suppose that, in natural variables, private bond sales are governed by  ( ) 1 0        where   £ £ = D f f t t t D P B . 
By log linearizing this equation, we obtain equation (7). This specification is similar to this used by Schalling 
(1995). 
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( )( ) 1 0            ,     / 1 £ £ + + = - f y l f t t t t p d b b         (7) 
 
Then, substituting (7) into (6), we can describe the extent to which the money supply 
accommodates changes in nominal budget deficits as follows: 
 
( )[ ]( )    ) 1 /(   1 1 t t t t p d m m + - - + = - y l f          (8) 
 
where  ( ) f - 1  denotes the monetary accommodation coefficient. In other words, this 
coefficient may be interpreted as an institutional parameter reflecting the independence 
degree of the Central Bank. The greater the economic independence of the Central Bank, the 
lower the degree of monetary accommodation. It can be seen from equation (8) that if Central 
Bank is completely independent ( 1 = f ) money growth is equal to zero and hence monetary 
policy completely dominates fiscal policy. On the other hand, if Central Bank is completely 
dependent ( 0 = f ) money growth is completely determined by the nominal budget deficit and 
hence fiscal policy completely dominates monetary policy. Consequently, the fraction of the 
budget deficit that is financed by private bond sales,  f , reflects the degree of monetary 
policy dominance, which reflects the concept of economic independence of Central Bank 
(Grilli, Masciandaro, Tabellini, 1991). Thus the greaterf , the greater the economic 
independence of Central Bank. 
 
2.3.The exchange rate policy 
Finally, we assume that monetary authorities decide on the degree to which the exchange rate 
is adjusted to the inflation rate. We consider a simple equation relating to the degree of 
exchange rate accommodation:  
 
1 0                     ,     £ £ = m m t t p e           (9) 
where the accommodation coefficient  m  describes the extent to which the nominal exchange 
rate accommodates changes in price level. If authorities choose a flexible exchange rate 
regime, the degree of exchange rate accommodation will be between zero and unity. If they 
opt for a fixed exchange rate regime, the degree of exchange rate accommodation is equal to 
zero.  The case  0 = m  implies no accommodation, while  1 = m  implies full accommodation. 
Finally, under rational expectations, agents are assumed to know the authorities’ reaction 
function and consequently the values of the parameters f  and  m .    
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3.  Central Bank independence and exchange rate policy  
From the solution of the model for a closed form for expected inflation, we derive two 
relationships between the degree of Central Bank independence and the degree of exchange 
rate accommodation, on the one hand, and the persistence of inflation, on the other hand.  
 
3.1. The closed form solution for inflation 
Solving equations (1) through (5) for domestic price level and taking into account equations 
(8) and (9) , we obtain 4 :  
 
( ) t t t t t t t t t h p  E p p E p k p q - + + - -     +      +   +     ) 4 / (    =   1 1 1                          (10) 
 
 where    ( ) [ ] ( ) b a g y f agl gb d m d + - - - + + - + ” ) 1 /(   ) 1 ( 1     k  , 
 and        ( ) ( ) [ ]( ) 1 1 1   ) (1 /  ) (1 ) (1   4 /   + - - + + + - - + - ” t t t t t t t d E d E d d h y f a y s g . 
Taking rational expectations of the expression (10) conditional on all available information at 
period  1 - t  for  t, we obtain the following second-order difference equation :  
 
) ( 4   +   ) 2 4 (   1 1   1 1 1 t t t t t t t+ t- h E kp p E k p E k q - - = - - - - -                        (11) 
 
Equation (11) can be rewritten as follows: 
 
( ) ) ( ) / 4 (   ) ( 1 1 2 1 2 1
2
t t t t t h E k p LE F F q r r r r - - = + + - - -        (12) 
with          ( ) 1          and       / 2 4 2 1 2 1 = - = + r r r r k k                
 
where  F is the forward operator, L is the lag operator, and  1 r  and 2 r  are the roots of the 
difference equation (11). From the definition of  k  and taking into account the parameter 
restrictions of the model, we can show that for reasonable parameter values k lies in the 
interval (0,1). With  1 0 < < k , we have  k 2 4 >  and thus,    0 2 1 > + r r . This imply that both 
roots are real, distinct and positive and they are on either side of unity:  2 1 1 0 r r < < < 5 . 
Adopting the bubble-free solution in the manner outlined by McCallum (1983), we take the 
                                                                 
4 To simplify, the foreign price level 
*
t p and the money stock  1 - t m  are normalized to zero in logs. 
5 It is presumed that  1 r  is the stable root and that  2 r is the unstable or « suppressing » root.     
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“minimal state variable” solution for  r , given by  [ ] ( )
2 / 1
1 1 ) / 2 ( / ) 2 ( k k k k - - - = r . 
Consequently, a saddle path solution results. Taking the first differences of equation (11) and 
solving forward yields the following closed form solution for expected inflation:  
 













2 1 1   1     ) 4(   +     =                                (13) 
 
Furthermore, assuming that government’s budget deficit shocks affecting aggregate demand, 




1 , 0 ~         ,      v t t t t N v v d d s + = -  
( )
2
1 , 0 ~         ,      u t t t t N u u s q q + = - , 
 
the expected inflation in equation (13) is given by : 
 
    =   1 1   1 - - D D t t t p p E r                (14) 
Finally, a closed-form solution for inflation may be derived from (10) and (11), as follows : 
 
      0 ith                w ,   1 1 1 = + D = D - - t t t t t E p p e e r        (15) 
 
According to equation (15), inflation follows an AR(1) process with an autoregressive 
parameter 1 r  denoting the degree of inflation persistence and which depends on the degree of 
monetary and exchange rate accommodation.  
 
3.2. Monetary and exchange rate accommodation 
To check now the effects of the degree of monetary accommodation, f - 1 , and the degree of 
exchange rate accommodation, m , on the inflation persistence 1 r , we state the characteristic 
equation of equation (12) as follows:  
 
                  ( ) 1     ,    0    with    ,   0 2 1 2 1
2 = = < + - = = + + r r r r c b c bz z    (16) 
where the root 1 r  can be rewritten as :  
c b c b b 4           whith 4 ) 2 / 1 ( ) 2 / 1 (
2 2
1 > - - - = r       (17)    
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By using the definitions of parameters k, b and c, we can show that the inflation persistence 
depends on the degree of Central Bank’s economic independence,    f , and the degree of 
exchange rate accommodation,  m . Using equation (17), two propositions can be established. 
Proposition 1: The greater the economic independence of the Central Bank (the higher 
  f ),  the lower the persistence of inflation (the lower  1 r ). 
Proof : Taking the first derivative of  1 r  with respect  to    f , we can find : 
















                    (18) 











 ,     
      and     
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
0
) 1 /(   ) 1 ( 1
4
2 <
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The explanation for this result is the following. On the one hand, an aggregate demand shock 
due to an exogenous increase in the real budget deficit raises the price level and thus 
increases the nominal budget deficit. According to equation (8), the higher nominal deficit 
raises the money supply, giving an additional inflationary impulse, which raises the nominal 
deficit even further, and causes additional monetary accommodation. Thus, inflation persists. 
On the other hand, the higher independence of central the bank   f , the lower the degree of 
monetary accommodation  f - 1  of nominal budget deficits. According to the rational 
expectations, the rule for the money evolution (8) is known to the private agents and thus 
wage setters form their expectations of the price level taking into account (8). If the Central 
Bank gains more independence (   f increases), wage setters realise that monetary policy 
becomes less accommodative to government budget deficits and thus expected inflation will 
be lower. Consequently, lower wages are reflected through the path of prices and the net 
outcome is lower inflation persistence.         
      
Proposition 2: The lower the degree of exchange rate accommodation (the smaller  m ), 
the lower the persistence of inflation (the lower  1 r ). 
Proof : Taking the first derivative of  1 r  with respect  to m , we can find : 
















                  (19)                         
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According to (19), a sufficient condition for having a positive relation between the degree of 
exchange rate accommodation and the inflation persistence is to assume that:  0 1 > + - gb d . 
The explanation for this result is the following. An increase in the degree of exchange rate 
accommodation causes a rise in the persistence of inflation via the real exchange rate channel 
(b ), via the wage cost channel (g ), but a decrease via the lower openness degree of the 
economy (high values of parameter d ). This condition implies a high degree of openness of 
the economy realised by lower values of the parameterd . The parameter restrictions in the 
model (i.e.  1 0 < <d ) imply that the relation between the degree of exchange rate 
accommodation and the inflation persistence is unambiguously positive. 
 
4.  Econometric methodology and empirical results 
 
4.1. Methodology  
The reduced form equation (15) provides the theoretical framework for testing inflation 
persistence and its reformulated as follows: 
D D p p t t t = + + - r r e 0 1 1   (15.a) 
 
where pt is the log of the consumer price index ,  Dindicates first difference and  et is the 
error term. The testing hypothesis involves that change in inflation persistence affects 
significantly the coefficient on lagged inflation in the equation 15.a. We also allow for shifts 
on the constant term to capture the effect on the mean inflation rate. The dates of the shifts in 
the coefficients indicate the change in the policy regime. To prevent ourselves from possible 
subjective break date specification, we adopt a framework, which detects multiple 
coefficients shifts determined by the data. This framework is based upon earlier work carried 
out by Perron (1989), Perron and Vogelsang (1992) and Zivot and Andrews (1992) and has 
recently advanced by Perron (1997). According to this framework, the null hypothesis of a 
unit root is set against the stationarity about a single broken line for alternative equation 
specifications. Details on model specifications are found in Perron (1989,1997) and for the    
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exposition of our results we will briefly refer on them. The first model is called “innovational 
outlier model 1” and it has the form of equation (16)  
y DU t D T y c y e t t b t t i
i
k
t i t = + + + + + + -
=
- ￿ m q b d a ( ) 1
1
D   (16) 
where m  is a constant, a measures the inflation persistence, t is a time trend the dummy DU 
captures the effect on inflation when the break occurs (the innovation term) and the dummy 







 corresponds to the number 
of additional lagged regressors of the first differenced depended variable included to remove 
serial correlation.  The unit root test is performed using the t-statistic for testing  a =1 in the 
above equation. This model allows only a change in the intercept under both the null and 
alternative hypothesis. 
 
The second model is called “innovational outlier model 2” and it has the form of equation : 
y DU t DT D T y c y e t t t b t t i
i
k
t i t = + + + + + + + -
=
- ￿ m q b g d a ( ) 1
1
D   (17) 
where the dummy D(T) captures the change in slope. The unit root test is performed using the 
t-statistic for testing  a =1 in the above equation. This model allows changes in the intercept 
and the slope under both the null and alternative hypothesis. 
Finally, the third model allows for the changes in slope but both segments of the trend 
function are joined at the time break. This is called the “additive outlier model” described by 
the following equations: 
yt t t t DT y = + + + m b g * ~   (18a) 
and 
~ ~ ~ y y c y e t t i
i
k
t i t = + + -
=
- ￿ a 1
1
D   (18b) 
The Unit Root test  1 = a  is performed on 18b using the t-statistic. In all equations, T b and k 
are treated as unknown. The methods on choosing the proper break dates and k are described 
in Perron (1997).  
We employ the procedure written by Colletaz and Serranito (1998) for Rats as developed by 
Doan (1997), to identify T b and k. Monthly data obtained from IMS CD-ROM, for selected 
EU countries (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain). The first sample period is chosen 
to cover the years 1980:1 until 1999:6 to capture the possible changing in the inflation 
persistence since the emergence of the EMS. The second sub period covers 1990:1-1999:6, to    
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detect any effects on inflation persistence due to institutional changes relative to the degree of 
the independence of the Central Banks in the economies under examination.  
 
 
4.2. The empirical results  
 
The results for the respective models are reported in Table 1. In most of the cases, the null 
hypothesis for a unit root is accepted despite the identified breaks in the intercept. Similarly, 
in most of the cases, the breaks are significant and accompanied by significant shifts in the 
mean inflation rate. The persistence of inflation appears to be influenced in all countries but 
in Spain.  
 
Table 1: 
Perron (1997) Sequential Tests for Break Points in the Inflation Equations: Innovational outlier model 1 
(Change in Intercept) 
Estimated equation:  y DU t D T y c y e t t b t t i
i
k
t i t = + + + + + + -
=








term (a ) 
Constant 
( m ) 
Innovation 
Term ( ) q  
Change in 
Inflation 




















































































































































































































               
 
For the case of France, a significant change of the mean inflation and a shift in inflation 
persistence occur on 1984:09 when the estimation sample covers the periods 1980:01-
1999:06. This break point occurs with a lag of 19 periods and seems to correlate quite well 
with the decision of French authorities to opt for a hard peg with respect to the Deutschmark 
in March 1983. The idea behind this decision was that these four countries hoped to avert an    
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inflation-depreciation spiral by begging their currencies to a strong currency such as the 
Deutschmark. This “hard franc” exchange rate policy, implemented in France after the third 
devaluation of the socialist government in March 1983, focused in pegging the franc/mark 
exchange rate in order to import credibility from a low inflation country such as Germany. 
Although we observe a fall in the inflation rate when the break occurs, this is not followed by 
a similar fall of the inflation persistence, implying therefore that the economic agents have 
not perceived this policy as credible, at least for this period of time. In the second estimation 
period  (1990:1-1999:6) the results reveal a break on 1995:06, which coincides with the 
announcements of major institutional changes concerning the role of the Central Bank as an 
independent monetary authority. These announcements appear to be credible and they are 
followed by a fall of the inflation persistence. 
 
 
For the case of Germany, we find a break in inflation rate on 1991:01, which can be 
identified with the German unification. However, the policy followed since 1990:1 appears as 
credible by the private agents, since there is a fall in the inflation persistence, which is 
possibly owed to the role of the Bundesbank.  
For the case of Italy, the break  is identified on 1982:07 and nearly corresponds the third 
consequent change in parity of Italian lira within EMS. However, this policy of realignments 
has not been perceived as credible maintaining therefore the inflation persistence. The 
decision of monetary authorities at the end of 1994 to follow a stable exchange rate of lira 
vis-à-vis the Deutschmark in order to become a low inflation EMU member, coincides with 
our findings (breakpoint on 1994:10) and indicates that this decision has been accepted as 
credible.     
Inflation data from Spain reveal a break on 1984:02 for the first estimation period (1980:1-
1999:6) and a break on 1996:11 for the second estimation period (1990:1-1999:6). The first 
breakpoint is identified with a period when the monetary authorities are engaged to a stable 
currency policy, in order to stabilise inflation to prepare the Spanish peseta for entry in the 
ERM. The second breakpoint (1996:11 with a 19 periods lag) appears to correspond with the 
decision to grant the Bank of Spain autonomy in June 1994. 
The statistical finding for Greece reveals a break on 1994:06 and a break on 1993:07 
respectively. Although the second break nearly coincides with the formal announcement of 
the hard drachma policy by the government, this announcement has not been perceived as 
credible.  
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5.      Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to provide theoretical arguments and find empirical evidence 
that the low inflation persistence may be achieved either by setting an independent Central 
Bank or by using an exchange rate policy that pegs the home currency to a low inflation 
currency. The approach used to determine of the most likely date for the change in regime 
was based on Perron (1997) where the null hypothesis of a unit root is set against the 
alternative of stationarity about a single broken trend. 
Among the suggested break points for the inflation equations of selected EMU countries, 
evidence shifts that occur in different time intervals after the commitment to fixed parities in 
Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS. This probably means that the EMS has not affect the 
inflation performance uniformly the countries under examination. We also find some 
evidence of additional breaks in the inflation equation that correspond to the institutional 
changes in the setting for monetary policy in France and Spain and the high degree of the  
independence of the Central Bank in Germany. The above empirical results confirm the 
theoretical intuition of the model where the exchange rate policy and the Central Bank 
Independence can affect the inflation persistence.    
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Appendix A : The government budget constraint 
 
The government monetary versus bond financing constraint is written in terms of natural 
variables as follows : 
       ( )    1 1 - - + - = D t t t t t t B r T G P F                 (A1) 
                       t t t B M F + =                   (A2) 
Equations (A1) and (A2) assert that the primary nominal budget deficit,  t t t t t D P T G P ” - ) ( , 
plus the interest owing on outstanding government debt,  1 1 - - t t B r , must be financed  either by 
creating money,  t M , or selling bonds, t B , to the private sector.  t F  denotes the nominal 
financial wealth. Log-linearizing (A1) and (A2) around a steady state and simplifying by 
assuming  1 1 - - t t B r  equal to zero, yields:  
                                     ( )     t t t p d f + = D l              (A3) 
( )      1 0     , 1     < < - + = y y y t t t m b f          (A4) 
where lower-case letters refer to logarithmic deviations from steady values as follows : 
( ) 0 0 / F F F f t t - ” ,  ( ) 0 0 / B B B b t t - ” ,  ( ) 0 0 / D D D d t t - ” ,  ( ) 0 0 / P P P p t t - ”  and  
( ) 0 0 / M M M m t t - ” .  0 0 0 / F D P ” l  is the steady growth rate on the reference path and 
0 0 / F B ” y  is the reference share of bonds in financial wealth. Upon substituting (A.4) in 
(A.3) and some rearrangement, we obtain the equation (6). 
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